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Abstract. As organizations have come under the increasing infl uence of 
global rules of all sorts, organization scholars have started studying the 
dynamics of global regulation. The purpose of this article is to identify and 
evaluate the contribution to this interdisciplinary fi eld by the ‘Stockholm 
Centre for Organisational Research’. The latter’s key proposition is that 
while global regulation often consists of voluntary best practice rules it 
can nevertheless become highly infl uential under certain conditions. We 
assess how innovative this approach is using as a benchmark the state of 
the art in another fi eld of relevance to the study of global regulation, i.e. 
‘International Relations’. Our discussion is primarily theoretical but we 
draw on the case of global anti-money laundering regulation to illustrate our 
arguments and for inspirations of how to further elaborate the approach. 
Key words. global governance; international organization; legitimacy; 
money laundering; regulation; standard
The seemingly anarchic global world is ordered to a surprising extent by 
rules. The global rule-making is driven by a multitude of actors, such as 
states, international organizations and private actors. Given the prominence 
and the chaotic nature of global regulation, it is hardly surprising that it 
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has given rise to a considerable research effort across a wide range of dis-
ciplines, ranging from legal studies, to economics and political science. 
More recently, organization scholars have also become interested in studying 
global regulation. Especially scholars working in the neo-institutional 
tradition have identifi ed global rules as important environmental factors 
shaping modern organizations. Most prominently, the ‘world society 
approach’ of the ‘Stanford School’ argues that organizations and states 
are increasingly shaped by highly infl uential world cultural templates 
(Boli and Thomas, 1999; Drori et al., 2006; Meyer et al., 1997). Other 
important contributions to the study of global regulation come from a 
group of scholars that due to their link with the ‘Stockholm Centre for 
Organisational Research’ (SCORE) we call here the Stockholm School. The 
starting point of this approach is the proposition that global governance 
is characterized by a shift to soft regulation: global regulators of all kind 
frequently create world order by setting voluntary rules, i.e. standards 
(e.g. Ahrne and Brunsson, 2004; Brunsson, 1999; Brunsson et al., 2000; 
Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Mörth, 2004; Tamm Hallström, 2004). 
While building on key insights of the Stanford School, focus is on the 
mechanisms of rule-creation and diffusion.
The purpose of this article is foremost to identify and discuss this 
approach’s principal contributions to the study of global regulation. 
We illustrate our discussion with insights from the global anti-money 
laundering regulation, as it has developed over the past 20 years. This is 
an interesting empirical case not only because one would hardly expect 
voluntary rules here, but also because it allows us to highlight one important 
aspect of global regulation so far overlooked: the fact that standards seem 
to follow a life cycle.
Our discussion is structured in the following way. First, we spell out the 
approach’s key propositions regarding global rule-making. In particular, 
we focus on the crucial role of expertise and ‘third party enforcement’ for 
making voluntary rules work. Thereby, we assess how innovative each of 
the key propositions actually is using as a benchmark the state of the art in 
the fi eld of International Relations (IR). The reason for this choice is—apart 
from personal familiarity—that IR-scholars should have considerable 
experience with global regulation. We then go on to show how standards 
work in different environments, as this promises to solve one of the major 
problems the IR-literature on global governance is struggling with: the global 
governance dilemma. Finally, we summarize our argument and indicate 
how the organizational approach could be developed further.
Standards on the Rise
According to the Stockholm School, global regulators have a peculiar way of 
creating global order: they seek to infl uence other autonomous organizations 
by stipulating best-practice rules. Such ‘standards’ are rules that ‘give advice 
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to many’ (Brunsson, 1999). Standards form a category of rules of their own, 
different from formal legal rules backed up by material sanctions, as well 
as norms backed up by socialization of actors. Furthermore, this concept of 
standard differs from the conventional understanding of standards as rules 
for co-ordination purposes dealing with mostly uncontroversial technical 
matters such as ensuring technical compatibility, or enhancing market 
transparency, and set by organizations that have been created specifi cally 
for that task. By contrast, the organizational approach sees standards as 
universal rules that can address any public policy issue and that can be 
set by any rule-maker.
This concept of standards as voluntary best-practice rules is a truly 
sweeping concept, as it captures a large amount of rule-making activity. The 
paradigmatic case of the transition in global rule-making to best-practice 
standards is the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). 
Formerly mostly involved with defi ning technical compatibility standards 
it is now also known for its ISO 9.000 standard for quality management 
and its ISO 14.000 standard for environmental management. But there 
are numerous other organizations involved in global standardization, 
for example the Codex Alimentarius Commission of the World Health 
Organization’s food safety standards (Princen, 2006), the World Intellectual 
Property Organization’s copyright standards, and the Basel Committee 
for Banking Supervision’s safety standards for banks (e.g. Kerwer, 2004). 
Organizations setting a large number of standards in different issue areas 
include the OECD and European Union. Examples of private actors defi ning 
voluntary best-practice standards are credit rating agencies (Kerwer, 2002) 
and the Forest Stewardship Council’s standards of sustainable forest 
management (Cashore, 2002).
The organizational approach offers a fresh perspective on global regu-
lation when compared to the status quo in IR. In this fi eld, the dominant 
metaphor of global rules is ‘international law’ (Raustiala and Slaughter, 
2002; Zürn and Joerges, 2005). The specifi cs of global regulation are dealt 
with as deviations from this ideal (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). The dominance 
of the law metaphor is also refl ected in the perspective on rule-making: 
public actors make the relevant regulation, private actors are only seen as 
participating in the process (Risse, 2002). The reason for this assumption 
that global rule-making needs to be about binding rules is not only analyt-
ical but also normative. It is a prerequisite for good governance in the 
public interest (Zürn and Joerges, 2005). However, organization theory 
suggests that this perspective might not do justice to the realities of global 
regulation.
In the following, we want to illustrate our discussion of the Stockholm 
approach with the example of anti-money laundering. This fi eld may be 
considered a hostile terrain for voluntary standards. Money laundering, i.e. 
the activity of converting illegal into legal money, is greatly facilitated by 
the benevolent regulatory environment of some states. In many instances 
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such states greatly benefi t economically from housing an ‘off-shore fi nancial 
centre’. For this reason, money laundering appears to be a policy problem 
of the tougher sort. Even if there were a general preference for preventing 
money laundering among all relevant states, cooperation would be diffi cult. 
Since states could benefi t from more restrictive regulation elsewhere, the 
actor constellation is a prisoner’s dilemma situation. Therefore, anti-money 
laundering rules would need to be backed up by material sanctions. Thus, 
if we were to fi nd voluntary rules in this case it would be a strong case for 
the signifi cance of voluntary standards in global regulation.
Present anti-money laundering efforts date back to the 1980s. In 1986, 
the US criminalized money laundering as part of its war against drugs 
(Helleiner, 1999; Reinicke, 1998: 143; Simmons, 2001: 607; Winer, 2002). 
Next, it won the support of its G7-partners for an international organization 
designed to fi ght money laundering world-wide. In 1989, the G7 established 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).1 In 1990, it released a set of rules on 
money laundering, after 9/11 complemented by a set of rules on the fi nance 
of terrorism (Rawlings and Unger, 2005: 8; Williams and Baudin-O’Hayon, 
2002: 138; Winer and Roule, 2002). These ‘40 + 9 Recom-mendations’ are 
standards in the sense of the organization theory featured here. They are de-
signed to motivate states to develop their own national anti-money launder-
ing rules. However, they do not force states to do so. This is the core message 
of its self-defi nition:
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body whose 
purpose is the development and promotion of national and international 
policies to combat money laundering and terrorist fi nancing. The FATF is 
therefore a ‘policy-making body’ created in 1989 that works to generate the 
necessary political will to bring about legislative and regulatory reforms in 
these areas. The FATF has published 40 + 9 Recommendations in order to 
meet this objective.2
Admittedly, FATF has backed up its voluntary standards with enforcement 
mechanisms. Members of the organization that fail to comply have to fear 
sanctions ranging from mere warning letters to outright expulsion from the 
organization. Non-members ignoring FATF standards risk being put on a 
‘black list’ that FATF publishes (see below). However, both enforcement 
mechanisms have remained rather weak. First of all, since the 40 + 9 Recom-
mendations are only broad frameworks they grant considerable leeway in 
how to comply with them. Second, even in cases in which compliance 
was problematic, sanctions were hardly ever applied. And fi nally, since 
membership in FATF is voluntary, members always have the option of 
escaping sanctions by leaving the organization. Non-members do not 
have this option, but the black list was short-lived. Overall, the sanctions 
attached to anti-money laundering standards are so weak that they are best 
classifi ed as standards rather than coercive rules.3 To conclude, despite the 
fact that money laundering is a policy problem that should require binding 
rules, regulators dealt with it by standards.
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Standards in Action
The Stockholm view of global regulation suggests taking seriously the fact 
that global regulation increasingly consists of standards. This raises the 
question how such standards can actually work. Especially in the global 
realm it seems to be rather unlikely that they have an impact. Why should 
powerful nation-states or multinational companies go through the trouble 
of following standards if they are only voluntary? In the following, we 
analyse how it is possible for standard-setters to motivate others to follow 
their rules. To this end we describe how standards work according to this 
theoretical framework and illustrate the main mechanisms by referring 
to the anti-money laundering case. We emphasize the crucial importance 
of expertise and argue that power is more important here than it might 
appear.
Expertise
The framework’s basic model of standardization consists of an actor con-
stellation in which one autonomous organization, the standard setter, seeks 
to infl uence another autonomous organization, the potential standard 
user. The standard setter is successful, whenever a potential user fi nds the 
standards to be incorporating knowledge which is relevant for problem 
solving (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000). If standards are based on such 
credible expertise, the standard-setter acquires rule-making authority and 
can routinely inspire other organizations to follow its standards according to 
the logic of appropriateness. Thus, legitimacy through expertise is the major 
explanation for how standard-setting works. In fact, the approach claims 
that it is one of the striking characteristics of standards that more than other 
types of rules they rely on specialized or expert knowledge. And more than 
that: standards are even defi ned as a special form of expertise: ‘Standards 
are expert knowledge stored in the form of rules’ (Jacobsson, 2000: 41). 
Accordingly, standard-setters incorporate expert knowledge by adopting 
organizational procedures that ensure that experts from various fi elds 
participate in the standard setting process (Tamm Hallström, 2004).
But how exactly is expertise doing the trick? How does it create legit-
imacy? The answer is that users easily accept ‘expertise’ as relevant and 
correct. Hence ‘the growing importance of standardization is linked to 
a high degree of legitimacy for those, who are presumed to know more 
than the rest of us’ (Jacobsson, 2000: 41). Two features of expertise are 
particularly important to understand how it creates legitimacy. First, 
expertise is a kind of knowledge that claims to be highly relevant for 
practical purposes. This is due to the nature of the type of knowledge 
that qualifi es as ‘expertise’. Expertise is stored in professions and organ-
izations, rather than in academic disciplines. Like scientifi c knowledge, 
expertise is general and abstract and thus has a wide fi eld of application. 
Unlike scientifi c knowledge, expertise embodies sound practical advice 
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(Tamm Hallström, 2004), and not just knowledge about the world, which 
often appears contradictory and hypothetical. This makes expertise 
useful to the user, reducing her search costs. Rather than searching for 
a custom-made solution to a problem, users will rely on the standards 
as guides in problem solving. Second, expertise is a kind of knowledge 
that claims to be correct. This claim is diffi cult to challenge for the user. 
Expertise is knowledge produced and administered by specialists and 
can only be challenged by specialists. ‘Their competence is considered so 
advanced … that it cannot be evaluated or controlled by persons without 
the same education and the same access to research’ (Jacobsson, 2000: 42). 
Expertise introduces an asymmetry between the expert that knows and the 
layperson that does not. Most of the time the layperson will have to trust 
the expert. This, too, makes expertise useful to the user, as she can rely on 
standards to justify her conduct. Following an accepted and widespread 
standard, for example a standardized environmental management system, 
will put the user in a strong position when held accountable.
The central role of expertise can be illustrated with the case of anti-money 
laundering standards. First, expertise had an impact on the standard setting 
process. Experts constituted a ‘transnational policymaking community’ 
with a shared world view, which enabled an agreement on a set of standards 
in less than a year after its foundation (Helleiner, 2002: 188–89). Second, 
expertise also promoted rule following among states: ‘The FATF process 
was driven by technocrats from fi nance ministries, regulators and law 
enforcement, not by foreign ministries or political fi gures. Its standards 
were neutral, and its judgements, initially confi dential, were recognized 
to be fair’ (Winer, 2002: 44). Or, to put it differently, expertise endows anti-
money laundering rules with legitimacy. For countries not members of 
FATF it is much easier to accept rules made by experts (even foreign ones) 
than rules by politicians from foreign countries. Experts are above the state. 
They represent causes not states. Hence, one can accept their rules in spite 
of not having participated in the rule-making.
These insights are corroborated by the empirical observation of how 
FATF works. FATF-members come together for plenary meetings three 
times a year. This is where the decisions are taken and where the rule-
making takes place. Therefore, one would assume this to be a political 
forum. But, according to the annual reports, plenary meetings are expert-
ground: FATF’s fi rst annual report, for example, notes that ‘more than 
one hundred and thirty experts from various ministries, law enforcement 
authorities, and bank supervisory and regulatory agencies, met and worked 
together’ (FATF Annual Report, 1989–1990: 3). And not a single annual 
report fails to point to the fact that FATF’s plenaries are expert-meetings. 
Similarly, FATF’s typology meetings are presented as ‘experts’ meetings’ 
(FATF Annual Report, 1998–1999: 6), as a ‘forum for law enforcement and 
regulatory experts’ (FATF Annual Report, 1998–1999: 48) to discuss recent 
trends in money laundering-methods and possible countermeasures.
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Another way in which expertise matters is the implementation pro-
cedure. To ensure that its members actually implement and apply the 
standards, FATF conducts so-called mutual evaluations. This is a monitor-
ing mechanism through which FATF-members evaluate each other. The 
literature praises this peer review for having been extremely effi cient in 
securing FATF-members’ compliance (Levi and Gilmore, 2002; Sansonetti, 
2000). It, too, is expert ground. FATF’s annual reports describe the evalu-
ation teams as consisting of ‘three or four selected experts, drawn from 
legal, fi nancial and law enforcement fi elds of other members’ (FATF 
Annual Report, 1998–1999: 9). This job is done by experts because they 
are seen as a guarantee for objective monitoring. One annual report 
explains: ‘The purpose of this exercise is to provide a comprehensive and 
objective assessment of the extent to which the country in question has 
moved forward in implementing effective measures to counter money 
laundering’ (FATF Annual Report, 1998–1999: 9, emphasis added). And 
the academic literature, too, considers ‘objectivity’ a main feature of the 
mutual evaluations (Sansonetti, 2000: 224). Thus, the mutual evaluation-
mechanism ‘holds out the promise of greater legitimation and ‘buy in’ 
potential than measures that are simply imposed’ (Levi and Gilmore, 
2002: 95).
Both the plenary meetings as well as the mutual evaluations regard 
FATF members. However, the expertise base is also a signal to non-members 
that FATF is an impartial regulator. The legitimacy of its measures is 
based on the fact that they are backed by experts. And with a view to the 
evaluation of non-members’ regulation, the internal evaluations’ objectivity 
should dilute fears among non-members of being evaluated in an unfair 
manner. FATF constructs mutual evaluations as a process where expertise, 
not power and politics matters. Overall, numerous procedural features of 
the anti-money laundering regime make it plausible that expertise is at 
least one important explanatory factor for rule-following.
This emphasis on expertise is reminiscent of the constructivist para-
digm in IR, which identifi es experts as important in shaping or creating 
the world view of co-operating states (e.g. Adler and Haas, 1992). However, 
there is a crucial difference in the understanding of how expertise works. 
It is probably fair to say that in IR the intuition dominates that experts are 
infl uential to the extent that they present arguments that persuade. This 
becomes especially clear, when the process of arguing is conceptualized 
as a Habermasian discourse (Müller, 1994; Risse, 2000). Organizational 
theory suggests a different mechanism by which expertise becomes 
important. Standard setters qualify their knowledge as expertise to avoid 
argument. They build their legitimacy by exploiting the asymmetry between 
experts and laypersons. The incorporation of expertise signals the rules’ 
effectiveness. In a nutshell, standard setters acquire rule-making authority 
if users believe that standards embody high quality expertise.
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Third Party Enforcement
Expertise, while important, is not the only way in which standards become 
compelling. Another important mechanism for explaining rule-following 
is enforcement (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000: 134–137; Kerwer, 2005: 
618–619). However, it is not standard setters themselves but rather other 
interested actors that make standards more compulsory. In fact, states, 
international organizations or private actors such as banks or individual 
fi rms by endorsing standards greatly boost their chances of success. For 
example, the European Union more recently adopted the accounting stand-
ards of the International Accounting Standards Board and by doing so has 
turned formerly voluntary standards into obligatory rules for many fi rms 
of its member states. Another example of enforcement is a multinational 
company that requires its suppliers to follow ISO quality management 
standards. If ‘third parties’ enforce standards in this way, the likelihood 
that standards are being followed greatly increases.
The mechanism of ‘third party enforcement’ is an ingenious way of 
re-introducing considerations of power in global regulation, making spe-
cifi c suggestions on how power matters. First, the concept of third party 
enforcement sees only a limited role for the use of power. Third party en-
forcement is considered an amplifi er of a standard-setting arrangement 
that is already working. But third party enforcement cannot replace the 
standard-setting arrangement itself. It is limited to standards that already 
have achieved a certain level of technocratic legitimacy. Second, the con-
ceptualization of third party enforcement puts limits on who may exert 
power. Thus, power is limited to enforcement by actors who are neither 
standard-setters nor standard-users. Most importantly, this conceptual-
ization of power as third party enforcement excludes that standard-setters 
themselves resort to force. This is highly plausible as the use of power 
would be an outright contradiction to the technocratic legitimacy that 
standard-setters seek to attain. If these propositions are true, we should be 
able to observe that if power is institutionalized as third party enforcement, 
the scope of standard-setting should be enhanced; if on the contrary, 
powerful actors seek to enforce standards which are not recognized, or if 
standard setters themselves seek to resort to force, then standard-setting 
should be weakened.
The case of anti-money laundering offers an excellent illustration of 
how this specifi c form of global rule-making involves a specifi c institu-
tionalization of power. FATF understood that compliance of its own 
members alone would not be enough. Money-launderers could easily 
escape anti-money laundering-rules in the OECD-world by shifting their 
activities to less regulated countries. Therefore, FATF needed to secure 
compliance of non-members, in effect global compliance, if it wanted to 
rule out money laundering (Sharman, 2006: 14). But why should non-
members comply with these rules, given that they had not participated in 
the rule-making process? For most observers, the reason is quite obvious: 
non-members comply because of force. In this understanding, FATF’s rules 
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are voluntary only on paper. And indeed, there is evidence that supports 
this interpretation: in 1999, FATF decided to evaluate non-members’ anti-
money laundering-performance and, if necessary, take countermeasures 
against countries unwilling to co-operate. This more aggressive stance 
resulted in the publication of a black-list of ‘Non-Cooperative Countries 
and Territories’ (NCCT) in 2000.4 Should blacklisted countries fail to set 
up and implement anti-money laundering-policies, FATF threatened to 
encourage its members to apply sanctions, in particular to deny access to 
their fi nancial systems (Kern, 2001: 243; Winer, 2002: 45). And coercion 
worked: when the black-list was fi rst published, 15 countries were named 
and shamed, and another eight were added later. Most affected countries 
reacted quickly and adopted measures in line with FATF-standards. In 2006, 
the last two countries remaining on the list, Myanmar and Nigeria, were 
removed. FATF fi nds that ‘overall, the NCCTs exercise has proved to be a 
very useful and very effi cient tool to improve worldwide implementation 
of the FATF 40 Recommendations’ (FATF, 2005). Adherence to the anti-
money laundering-rules seems to follow the logic of power politics, with 
non-FATF-members having little other choice than taking over FATF’s 
standards, as FATF-members’ combined economic power by far outweighs 
that of non-members’. Non-members, to put it in a paradox, are forced to 
comply voluntarily. This explanation is prevalent in the literature (Drezner, 
2005: 850–853; Kern, 2001: 243; Winer, 2002: 45).
But is compulsory power the whole story? The evidence looks certainly 
impressive: 21 countries on the black-list in 2001, with none remaining on 
the list today makes for a signifi cant correlation between coercion and 
compliance. And there appears to be a causal relation between the two 
as well: black-listing changes a country’s calculation of self-interest by 
increasing the costs of non-compliance. Hence one cannot deny that the 
black-list has enhanced compliance considerably. However, we would argue 
that it has only been an episode in the history of anti-money laundering, 
which is hardly typical for how FATF works. Not only did it arrive rather 
late on the scene (ten years after FATF’s foundation), but also before long, 
it was abolished again. In 2002, only three years after its initiation, FATF 
decided to discontinue the practice of black-listing. The reason for this is 
that it threatened the legitimacy of FATF as a global regulator. Affected 
countries could argue that FATF as an exclusive club cannot legitimately 
interfere into their internal affairs in this direct way (Sharman, 2003: 8). 
This is an effective challenge to the mechanism because ‘even coercive 
strategies like blacklisting and sanctions indirectly rely on third parties 
judging that such penalties and threats are fair and legitimate in order to be 
effective’ (Sharman, 2003: 11). The IMF and the World Bank, with which 
the FATF had planned to co-operate (Holder, 2003: 378–379; Schott, 2003: 
X2–X6), were such doubtful third parties. Both demanded a suspension 
of the black-list as a precondition for becoming engaged in the fi ght 
against money laundering (Sharman, 2006: 21).
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Thus, there is evidence for the fact that the choice to institutionalize 
rule-making as standard-setting allows for using power but also puts limits 
on possible ways of coercion. This is what the institutionalization of power 
means in a very classical sense: by subjecting power to certain rules, it be-
comes more limited but at the same time more effective. At least, the 
anti-money laundering standards should be more effective than gunboat 
diplomacy in the case of non-compliance.
Overall, the so far little regarded mechanism of third party enforcement 
is an interesting contribution to a research concern in the fi eld of global 
regulation. As an antidote to an overly cosy image of global rule making 
as co-operative problem-solving exercises, in IR there has been a revival 
of interest in how power shapes global regulation (Barnett and Duvall, 
2005; Millennium, 2005). One problematic tendency of this literature is to 
regard global regulation mostly as an instrument in the hands of powerful 
states. The organizational approach, in contrast, shows how in standard-
setting the use of soft rules matters but is also limited. In this perspective, 
global regulation continues be a relevant object of study and not just an 
epiphenomenon of power.
Standards in Context
More recently, the Stockholm framework on standardization has been 
extended by a consideration of how environmental factors can infl uence 
standard-setting strategies. Comparing the International Standard 
Organisation (ISO) and the International Accountancy Standards Committee 
(IASC), Tamm Hallström (2004) has shown that the two standard setters 
use quite different strategies to promote their standards. Both, the ISO and 
the IASC rely heavily on the quality of their standards and try to secure the 
quality not least by incorporating experts (output legitimacy). However, 
the IASC in addition continually demonstrates that the standards were 
also made in the correct way (input legitimacy).5 Why is it that one standard-
setter can do without participation of the standards’ users, while the other 
standard-setter tries to enhance its legitimacy by allowing for participation? 
The answer given in Tamm Hallström’s study is that this is an effect of dif-
ferent environments. While ISO standards address new issues, the IASC 
operates in a fi eld with a long tradition of rule making by different actors. 
ISO operates in a ‘technical environment’ and IASC in an ‘institutional 
environment’. While organizations operating in technical environments 
can legitimize themselves by their output only, institutionalized environ-
ments consist of norms that organizations also need to conform to (Powell 
and DiMaggio, 1991). Similarly, Tamm Hallström (2004) shows that standard-
setters in a technical environment need to show what they do, while in an 
institutionalized environment they also need to show how they do it.
What are the consequences of this fi nding? The case of a standard-setter in 
a technical environment is rather unproblematic. It can focus on making its 
rules effective through expertise as it does not have to put up with demands 
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as to greater participation. However, standard setters in institutional-
ized environments fi nd themselves in a contradictory situation (Tamm 
Hallström, 2004). On the one hand, they face the requirement to increase 
user participation. On the other hand, they have to secure the high quality 
of their standards by incorporating expertise. The two tasks, however, may 
be in confl ict, as it cannot be expected that every user affected by standards 
will have the capability to design good standards. Standard-setters facing 
such a contradictory situation need to fi nd ways to manage it, they need 
in one way or another balance between input- and output-legitimacy.
The money-laundering case serves as a good illustration for both these 
observations: it shows how standard-setters can escape the dilemma of 
global governance by choosing non-binding rules, but it also illustrates 
how—in some environments—they fail to do so. In an initial phase, the rule-
makers did indeed operate in a technical environment. When established 
in 1989, FATF entered a fi eld which did not exist before. Therefore, it was 
possible that only a small number of experts from a limited number of states 
drafted and published the 40 Recommendations designed to eradicate 
the practice. FATF as a rule-maker almost exclusively relied on output 
legitimacy, i.e. on the high problem-solving capacity of its rules.
However, in the mid-1990s, the environment of anti money laundering 
began to change. As more and more actors—private and public, national, 
transnational and international—populated the field of anti-money 
laundering, the context in which regulation took place was no longer purely 
technical. Rather, it showed signs of an institutional environment. And, 
much like the organizational approach would expect, FATF did adapt its 
rule-making style to the changing context. Instead of relying on expertise 
alone, it tried to enhance the participation of the various actors now active 
in the fi eld. Regarding private actors, FATF, in 1996, initiated the Financial 
Services Forum, in which regulators consult with the affected fi nancial 
industry (Reinicke, 1998: 160; Simmons, 2000: 255, Fn. 32). Also, during the 
latest review of the 40 Recommendations (2001–2003) the private sector 
was asked to contribute (FATF Annual Report, 2000–2001: 17) and FATF 
prides itself with having incorporated many suggestions from the fi nan-
cial industry into the fi nal text of the revised Recommendations. (FATF 
2002–2003: 4).
Regarding public actors, an exclusive FATF faced increasing dis-
satisfaction of the many countries which were not members of FATF and 
therefore could not participate in the making of the global anti-money 
laundering standards, but were still asked to comply. In order to mitigate 
its all too obvious legitimacy problem, FATF backed down from its highly 
exclusive membership-policy, according to which only OECD-countries 
were eligible to become members. In 1998, FATF decided ‘to bring into 
FATF some additional strategically important countries’ (FATF Annual 
Report, 1997–1998: 9). Since then, four new members—Argentina, Brazil, 
South Africa and Russia—have been accepted. Also, China and South Korea 
have been granted observer status, allowing them to participate at FATF’s 
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plenary meetings. Both countries are expected to become full members in 
the near future. And recently, India has applied for membership as well. 
Eventually then, the rule-making in the anti-money laundering fi eld will 
be considerably more democratic than it used to be, as a far larger part of 
the world population will have a (theoretical) infl uence on the making 
of the rules they are affected by, e. g. when opening a bank account and 
asked for personal details. Still, the majority of states remains outside FATF 
and hence is not involved in the making of the standards. Yet FATF has 
taken measures for enhancing the participation of these countries as well. 
It supported the creation of autonomous regional anti-money laundering 
organizations called ‘FATF-Style Regional Bodies’ (FSRBs). Though the 
fi rst of these FSRBs had been established already in the early 1990s, it 
was only in the new millennium that FATF took up this strategy again and 
pushed regions around the world to follow these early examples. This led 
to the establishment of several new FSRBs. Most recently, in June 2006, 
GIABA has been recognized as West Africa’s anti-money laundering body, 
raising the total number of FSRBs to eight. The function of these regional 
anti-money laundering organizations is to devise local implementation 
strategies for FATF’s money laundering standards through mechanisms 
such as self-assessments and peer reviews.
It cannot be denied that this trend towards more participation has its 
limits. Private actors may offer their views in the Financial Services Forum 
and comment on revised standards, but they do not have decision-making 
power. Similarly, non-member states’ participation is limited in many 
respects: access to membership is restricted to a few countries deemed 
‘strategically important’ and FATF emphasizes its intention to remain an 
exclusive organization (FATF Annual Report, 2003–2004: Annex p. 2). 
Moreover, the autonomy of the regional anti-money laundering organiza-
tions is limited. The FSRBs are formally independent international 
organizations, yet FATF heavily infl uences their operation by providing 
vital fi nancial and technical assistance (for an example see Reinicke, 1998: 
164). It pushes the FSRBs to endorse the 40 Recommendations rather than 
developing their own standards and ascertains that the FSRB’s mutual 
evaluation mechanisms are in line with its own procedures (FATF Annual 
Report, 1996–1997: 23).
Against this background, the increased participation looks like mere 
window dressing, introduced by FATF to avoid the impression of riding 
roughshod over the autonomy of fi rms and the sovereignty of states. 
However, this interpretation is overblown: it neglects that chances for 
participation did increase over the course of FATF’s existence. What is 
more, it neglects that enhanced participation does not only aim to increase 
input legitimacy (participation of those affected by rule-making) but also 
output legitimacy (participation by experts of all kinds). For example, the 
increasing participation of private actors will increase the chance that 
the rules become more effective. Also, states participating in the FSRBs are 
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more likely to comply with and implement rules. From the perspective of 
the organizational approach featured here, the limitation of participation 
does make sense, as FATF tries to avoid a decision-making deadlock. By 
allowing for participation, but not for too much of it, FATF balances between 
input and output legitimacy.
While it appears as if FATF has actually found a balance between 
legitimacy and effectiveness, the very latest developments are perhaps 
indicative of FATF beginning to loose balance. FATF may soon count three 
more members—China, India and South Korea. Also, FATF has granted 
some FSRBs associate membership. This could in the future make it 
harder for FATF to agree on those standards experts suggest to be the most 
effective. FATF, it seems to us, will become a more political organization 
in the future, characterized by political bargaining and lowest common 
denominator solutions. Expertise will be considerably less important. 
The balance between effectiveness and legitimacy could be lost.
Tamm Hallström’s extension of the original model of standardization 
addresses a topical issue in IR. One major problem observed by students of 
IR is that rule-making beyond the nation-state is becoming increasingly 
diffi cult. International rule-setters such as the UN, the WTO or the EU have 
diffi culties revising old and making new rules. This problem is attributed to 
a governance dilemma (see e.g. Grande and Pauly, 2005). Usually, sovereign 
states are only willing to get involved in international rule-making, if they 
can veto any rules they dislike. In order that unanimity decision-making 
does not lead to decision-making deadlocks, multilateral institutions 
have had a small and homogenous membership. In short, they have been 
organized as exclusive ‘clubs’ (Keohane and Nye, 2002). However, the clubs 
have had diffi culties in keeping their doors shut. In a shrinking world, 
more countries are likely to be affected by global problems and/or by the 
rules of the global rule-makers. Invoking the norm of democracy, which 
holds that those affected by a rule have a right in participating in the mak-
ing of it, they demand access to international rule-making. But a larger 
and more heterogeneous membership jeopardizes the capacity of mak-
ing rules. Overall, international rule-makers are thus confronted with a 
formidable dilemma: if they chose to remain exclusive clubs, they will 
be undemocratic, if they chose to become inclusive forums, they will be 
ineffective (see Dahl, 1994; Scharpf, 1999).
The organizational approach, by virtue of highlighting the prevalence 
of voluntary rules, questions whether the dilemma is relevant to all global 
regulators. A global governance dilemma only arises for regulators thriving 
for binding rules. Only under this condition will rule takers fi nd it harder 
to ignore them and therefore demand more participation. If regulators use 
standards, rule-takers can more easily evade them and are therefore less 
likely to demand participation. One important implication of this approach 
is thus that standards are a way for regulators to avoid the dilemma of global 
governance. At the same it also alerts us that the viability of this escape route 
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depends on the environments in which regulators operate. In institutionalized 
environments, regulators using standards are likely to encounter the same 
dilemma as regulators using hard law.
Standards in Demise?
As we are witnessing a transformation of governance beyond the state, 
the Stockholm School helps us understand what exactly is going on. Most 
importantly, it teaches us that voluntary rules are characteristic of the new 
form of global governance and it explains how such rules can become 
consequential despite their voluntary nature.
The approach challenges the status quo of the IR perspective on global 
rule-making in a number of ways. By suggesting that the trend towards 
voluntarism is a shift to a form of governance in its own right it challenges 
the common view in IR that voluntary rules are only a derivative of bind-
ing rule-making by law. By arguing that the infl uence of standards is due 
to expertise, it challenges IR’s ideas about compliance: not so much the 
force of material sanctions (as rationalist approaches would have it) and 
not the better argument (the constructivist view) make rule-takers follow 
the rules, but the incorporation of expertise. At fi rst glance, this might look 
like an approach that ignores the role of power, a reason why IR-scholars 
would most likely dismiss it as being irrelevant for studying global politics. 
However, we have shown that the opposite is true. In fact, this organiza-
tional approach enables us to see the smart ways by which power is being 
played out in the global realm. It is not just the use of rather unsophisticated 
means of coercion such as threats or material sanctions we encounter in 
global rule-making; power is also exerted in a disciplined way. Lastly, 
this also questions whether the global governance dilemma, taken pretty 
much as a given by students of IR, really exists. In fact, it suggests there is 
a solution to this dilemma. Due to the voluntary nature of standards, it is 
possible to keep decision-making exclusive or to structure participation 
in such a way as to avoid decision-making deadlocks. Yet, we will argue 
below that this may not be the end of the story.
To illustrate our theoretical argument we have referred to the inter-
national efforts to combat money laundering. This is a good example with 
which to show that non-binding rules are all but a marginal phenomenon, 
because from an IR-perspective one would expect this to be a highly 
securitized issue where only binding rules can be successful. Yet, 
beyond providing us with some empirical fl esh, the money laundering 
case has proven highly interesting for another reason: it not only shows 
that organizational theory takes us a long way to understanding global 
governance and thus challenges conventional approaches in IR, but it also 
confronts the organizational approach with a considerable challenge: our 
empirical evidence suggests that perhaps the solution to the governance 
dilemma offered by the Stockholm School is not very sustainable. It may 
be a viable strategy in the short term to simply make voluntary rather than 
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binding rules, but it seems that in the long term the global governance 
dilemma strikes back. FATF started out as an exclusive club in order to 
establish strong standards. Once these standards have become widespread, 
users demanded more participation. This forced the standard-setter to 
balance between input and output legitimacy. While it appears that FATF for 
some time has managed to keep the balance, latest developments indicate 
that the balance will eventually tip towards input legitimacy.
Should this impression be confi rmed by future developments, the 
framework of the Stockholm School needs to be extended. We suggest con-
ceptualizing standards as following a life cycle: they start out as highly 
effective rules based on expertise, then become more legitimate by allow-
ing for a limited degree of standard user participation while retaining their 
earlier effectiveness, until fi nally participation will increase to an extent 
where the standards’ quality goes down and effectiveness decreases. Such 
an extension would certainly be useful for IR-scholars, as they would then 
understand not only why international regulators increasingly rely on 
voluntary rules, but also why this strategy may fail.
Notes
We thank the editors of this special issue as well as three anonymous reviewers 
for their helpful comments. Earlier versions of this text have been presented 
at a meeting of the ‘Ad-hoc Gruppe Internationale Politische Ökonomie’ at the 
German Political Science Association conference in Münster 2006 and in the 
colloquium on International Relations at the University of Munich, chaired by 
Christopher Daase. We acknowledge the helpful input from these discussions. The 
empirical research, on which this article partly draws, has been carried out in the 
context of a research project on ‘Globalisation and the Future of the Nation-State’ 
(Sonderforschungsbereich 536, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) under the 
auspices of Edgar Grande.
1 For general accounts of FATF see, for example, Kern (2001), Johnston and 
Lim (2002), and Tranøy (2002); for a political science approach to anti-money 
laundering see Helleiner (2002), Simmons (2000), Williams and Baudin-O’Hayon 
(2002).
2 http://www.fatf-gafi .org (accessed March 15, 2007).
3 With respect to FATF members, FATF’s rule-making activities should be analysed 
within a theory of meta-organizations rather than standard-setting (see Ahrne 
and Brunsson, 2005).
4 For an overview of the NCCT-process see FATF’s NCCT-website: http://www.
fatf-gafi .org/pages/0,2966,en_32250379_32236992_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed 
March 15, 2007). This site gives a general description of the process and provides 
access to the NCCT-reports.
5 For the distinction between input and output legitimacy see Scharpf (1999).
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